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Syria’s Society Upended 
Societal Rifts Pose a Massive Challenge to Pursuit of a Political Solution 
Khaled Yacoub Oweis 
The Syrian civil war has profoundly altered established business structures, a delicate 
balance of religious values, and long-standing ties between urban and rural areas. New 
networks, identities, and social hierarchies have emerged in connection with the war 
economy, the militarization of the public sphere, and signs of ethnic cleansing. Any 
formal end to the conflict is unlikely to halt the violent societal transformation. Co-
existence will remain a major challenge due to the nature of the cleavages. However, 
an inclusive political system that ends the marginalization of the Sunni majority, 
accepts diversity, and protects minorities is a prerequisite for reducing the levels of 
profound mistrust between the different societal groups. 
 
Virtually all Middle East regimes used divide-
and-rule tactics to manage their societies 
prior to the “Arab Spring” revolts. Day-to-
day, they employed tarheeb wa targheeb (ter-
rorization and inducement) – their version 
of the carrot-and-stick approach. Rulers of 
republics coming from a religious minority, 
such as was the case in Syria and Iraq, tend-
ed to use a more brutal version because 
they needed to domesticize the majority 
sect of the population, in whose eyes they 
had little legitimacy – neither democratic, 
“traditional,” nor religious. 
The fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and 
the demise of Sunni minority rule in Bagh-
dad did little to change the strategy of the 
Alawite regime in Damascus. The Assad 
clan seized upon chunks of the economy 
and awarded enormous privileges to other 
elites associated with it. Underpinning the 
system – apart from the security apparatus – 
were partnerships between the top Alawite 
tier and Sunni merchants, mainly in Da-
mascus and Aleppo. The regime subjugated 
the largely Sunni tribes, which, as a result, 
disintegrated over the decades. At the same 
time, it gave them a role in communal 
management. Peasants were subsidized 
before the partial liberalization of the eco-
nomy in the mid-2000s, and the lifting of 
subsidies contributed to socio-economic 
havoc. The Kurdish community was mal-
treated and disenfranchised, except for on-
and-off regime backing of the Turkish Kur-
distan Workers’ Party (PKK). 
As the first wave of the Arab Spring hit 
North Africa in late 2010, Bashar al-Assad 
tried to preempt the Syrian revolt by mak-
ing rhetorical commitments to improve the 
lot of the regime’s non-Alawite base, but 
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societal and economic rifts had grown too 
deep to be contained by the system that had 
fostered them. For instance, the regime no 
longer could manage the young jihadis and 
other Islamist actors who it had, in part, 
nourished in order to present Assad as the 
only alternative to chaos and to pressure 
the West into ending periods of limited 
isolation on the regime from 2005 to 2008. 
Social Impacts of the War Economy 
The dynamics of the civil war, which fol-
lowed the crackdown on the 2011 revolt, 
produced massive social fragmentation. It 
broke down social, economic, and genera-
tional hierarchies, and it fueled new mili-
tary-economic networks. The power balance 
between religious and ethnic groups was 
altered. Social mobility no longer depended 
on having links to the regime; as a result, 
the Assad clan’s control over a governing 
system that fused cronyism and sectarian 
rule abated sharply. 
New Markets for Junior Actors 
The progressive loss of central authority 
diluted the concentration of economic 
spoils among the regime’s top tier. New or 
bigger markets opened to previously junior 
actors, typically in their 30s, in regime 
areas and in rebel territory. 
Among the loyalist ranks, loot and a 
slice of the black market were the main 
incentives for thousands recruited into the 
regime’s militias. Relatively low-ranking 
personnel in the intelligence apparatus 
who had lived off relatively petty bribes 
enriched themselves by charging for infor-
mation of detained persons in the regime’s 
jails and al-mukhabarat (intelligence) dun-
geons. It has been common for families to 
sell all their assets for cash just to learn 
whether their sons are dead or alive. Others 
rose to the top of the extortion rackets of 
the besieged areas. Fuel supplies to regime 
territory and energy dealings with areas 
under the control of the so-called Islamic 
State (also derogatorily called Da’ish) 
became big business. The new profiteers 
sought to enhance their social stature. 
Backed by their own private militias, they 
bullied former pillars of the business com-
munity in order to take over their positions, 
as a more outwardly violent mode of doing 
business developed after 2011. 
A main figure and typical representative 
of this new business elite is Samer al-Foz. 
A previously unknown young figure in 
Latakia, Foz apparently bought assets in 
2017 belonging to Imad Ghreiwati – one 
of a generation of businessmen known 
as “friends of Bashar” before the revolt – 
with cash from war profiteering. Among 
Foz’s new reported assets is the Orient 
Club, which is a fixture of the old Damas-
cene elite. The purchase of the club signals 
Foz’s success in entering the bourgeois 
hierarchy in the capital. 
Former junior actors came to the fore 
as well in opposition areas. In the suburbs 
of Eastern Ghouta on the outskirts of Da-
mascus, a long siege fueled a tunnel trade 
that resulted in traditional merchants 
giving way to a younger generation. The 
“new capitalists” made their fortunes 
during sieges by sourcing basic supplies 
and goods and transporting them through 
tunnels. They partnered with the rebels, 
and in many cases with the regime, and 
needed clerics for legitimacy. Many of the 
clerics maneuvered between the changing 
social strata, earning figurehead member-
ship in various religious consultation and 
adjudication councils tied to rebel brigades. 
These councils legitimized the brigades’ 
involvement in the war economy and war-
fare against other rebels, which in many 
cases involved competition over resources 
as well as religious ideology. 
The tunnels ran from Eastern Ghouta to 
rebel territory near the Damascus district 
of al-Qaboun. However, under a surrender 
deal in the first half of 2017, the rebels were 
bussed out of the district to opposition 
areas away from the capital. Most tunnels 
closed after the rebels lost Qaboun, giving 
a former small trader called Mohieddine 
Manfoush a virtual monopoly of supplying 
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Eastern Ghouta. Manfoush had built solid 
relations with – and a network of – inter-
mediaries with the regime as well as the 
rebels, enabling him to move goods openly 
overland.  
The new hierarchies could be challenged 
by political developments. Eastern Ghouta, 
a main target of a nerve gas attack that 
killed hundreds of civilians in 2013, is sup-
posed to be included in the planned “de-
escalation zones.” The zones were proposed 
in May 2017 by the three guarantors (Russia, 
Turkey, and Iran) of the Astana peace talks, 
which have been held in Kazakhstan since 
early 2017. With Moscow acting as the 
zones’ most ardent proponent, it is unlikely 
that the zones will result in a West Berlin-
style scenario, that is, an island surrounded 
by “enemy” territory, but with relatively 
free access to the outside world. Delinea-
tion and levels of access to the zones would 
likely again reshape local societal dynamics. 
Revenge of the Rural Poor 
The militarization of the revolt since the 
second half of 2011 placed marginalized 
Sunnis at the center of the armed resistance 
to Assad. They comprised inhabitants of the 
countryside and those of rural origins who 
lived in poorer districts of cities and nearby. 
The military role provided them with the 
power to redress the socio-economic im-
balance in relation to the richer segments 
of society allied with the Alawite elite. 
After Assad’s grip lessened, social mobility 
for many rural Sunnis became dependent 
on local parameters and communal dynam-
ics rather than links to regime elites. Griev-
ances emerged, and many of the Sunni poor 
began calling themselves al-mustad’afoun 
(the oppressed), a term mentioned in the 
Koran. The same term has been used to de-
rive legitimacy for the political and social 
ascendency of the Shi’ites in Iraq and Leba-
non in the last 10 to 20 years. 
The Syrian regime viewed the rural 
Sunnis, especially those who had rebelled 
against it in the 1980s in Hama and Idlib 
governorates, as “untrustworthy elements.” 
In contrast to the countryside and the slums, 
the military and the regime’s security 
tended to be more entrenched in the more 
well-off sectors in cities. The rebel capture 
of territory, mostly on the periphery, re-
inforced social demarcation lines, not only 
between the countryside and the cities but 
between richer and poorer districts in the 
cities themselves. These lines had developed 
in large part because of the regime’s neglect 
of the rural poor and the development of 
patters of legal and illegal dwellings tied to 
corruption, zoning, and social engineering. 
Old Rural Nobility Hit New Low 
The economic changes that accompanied 
the war have further diminished what is 
left of the old rural nobility, which had 
survived waves of nationalization and 
socialist agrarian policies in the past. One 
such example is the town of Qalaat al-Madiq, 
in Hama governorate. Here, rural social 
tensions have simmered since agrarian 
reform in the 1950s. It pitted former tenant 
farmers who were awarded land against the 
old nobility who had managed to retain 
some of their original lands. During the 
civil war, Qalaat al-Madiq, which is situated 
near the Roman ruins of Apamea on the 
edge of the Ghab Plain, lost its agricultural 
holdings. The loss was mostly due to regime 
shelling intended to prevent cultivation in 
rebel areas. The former tenant farmers in 
the town joined rebel brigades, in particu-
lar Ahrar al-Sham, which is a large Salafist 
group that controls a main crossing with 
Turkey. Geography and the link to Ahrar al-
Sham helped transform Qalaat al-Madiq 
into a main conduit of Turkish goods and 
fuel to rebel areas starting in 2012. The new 
trading and smuggling rings displaced the 
old landowning nobility at the top of the 
social pyramid. The growing commercial 
activity in the town helped compensate the 
region for the lack of access to the provincial 
capital of Hama, which the regime overran 
with tanks in August 2011. 
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Hinterlands Become Centers 
Along with changes of economic structures 
due to the regime’s control of traditional 
centers of commerce, societies in the hinter-
lands changed as a result of the large num-
bers and diversity of refugees who fled there. 
With rebel-held Idlib governorate cut off 
from Aleppo, the small town of Sarmada 
turned into a hub for foreign currency and 
money transfers, and services replaced agri-
culture as the town’s economic mainstay. 
Across Idlib, young entrepreneurs compet-
ed vigorously among each other to provide 
services. They set up local communication 
towers that enabled residents of rebel areas 
to buy internet usage and communicate 
through voice and messaging applications.  
The swelling of the population across 
Idlib as a result of refugees made it more 
difficult for various jihadist and hardline 
Salafist brigades that had captured most of 
Idlib to enforce their religious codes, such 
as the wearing of the niqab (full-face cover) 
or bans on smoking, although the niqab was 
fairly common in Syria’s Sunni countryside 
before the revolt. In some instances, social 
mores were adapted to suit businesses. For 
example, the town of al-Dana in Idlib was 
able to attract business by adopting a less 
strict social attitude toward the masses of 
displaced persons. The original inhabitants 
of Dana, who numbered around 30,000 
before the revolt, were influenced by the 
70,000 more socially relaxed refugees from 
other parts of Syria who had made Dana 
their new home. The social leeway in Dana 
enticed displaced families and even women 
living alone to rent property in the town. 
One woman who fled Aleppo and who did 
not wear the full-face veil rented a house 
and lived by herself in Dana for months. 
No questions were asked.  
Class Clashes in Aleppo 
One of the main figures who conveyed the 
cause of rural Sunnis into an instrument of 
power after 2011 was Abdul Qader Saleh, a 
merchant turned rebel commander from 
the town of Marea in the Aleppo country-
side. Known as Hajji Marea, Saleh led the 
Islamist Tawhid brigades. He represented 
a layer of lower-class or socially obscure 
Sunnis, who tended to be more conserva-
tive and lacked the links urban business-
men had with the regime. Their base dis-
trusted the Sunni bourgeois. 
Before a regime strike killed Saleh in 
Aleppo in 2013, Tawhid led a rebel capture 
of the eastern sector of the city. Compared 
to the more affluent western Aleppo, its 
inhabitants mostly comprised fairly recent 
migrants from the countryside of Aleppo 
and Idlib governorates and from more arid 
regions in eastern Syria. Residents of al-
Sakhour, one of Aleppo’s bigger neighbor-
hoods, made livings as underpaid industrial 
workers or in quarries and cotton mills. 
Dwellings in eastern Aleppo were known as 
ashwaeiyat (random), because they were 
built without permits and had no titles or 
recognition in official records. More than 
half of all urban dwellings in Syria before 
2011 were estimated to fall into the 
ashwaeiyat category. In contrast, properties 
were officially registered and delineated 
in the western neighborhoods of Aleppo, 
which brought them roads and services. 
The housing market and property registra-
tions have been the main tools in the 
regime’s cooptation arsenal. Still today in 
Aleppo and other regime areas, home 
ownership is largely dependent on so-called 
housing associations, comprised of groups 
of would-be owners who qualify for loans 
from state banks to build residential build-
ings according to their loyalties to the 
regime. Once the building is completed, 
several apartments are reserved for free for 
officials or intelligence operatives to sell, 
live in, or give to their cronies or as bribes, 
including to judges and other officials who 
facilitate their business. 
In an outpouring of resentment against 
Aleppo’s elite, the looting of factories had 
marked the fall of the eastern sector to the 
rebels. Their owners were seen as regime 
lackeys. However, the relationship was more 
nuanced. Many among the well-off in west-
ern Aleppo had seen little choice other than 
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to work with the system or leave Syria. They 
blamed the regime for the demise of Aleppo 
as a cosmopolitan hub, the flight of its mi-
nority populations, and for the stifling of 
free enterprise. On the other hand, some 
touted their connections with the regime. 
One industrialist opened a factory in Jordan 
after his factory in Aleppo, which employed 
700 workers and relied on export business, 
was looted. Speaking next to a framed photo 
of Assad at his office in Amman, he com-
plained that costs in Jordan were too high 
because, unlike Syria, he could not bribe 
his way out of paying workers’ insurance. 
Sufis versus Salafists 
Almost no one dared complain publicly 
about the sectarian cronyism practiced by 
the regime in the pre-2011 era, but it was 
a main source of underlying Sunni resent-
ment. Dissidents, who included Alawites, 
regarded the system as unsustainable and 
championed democratic transformation as 
the alternative to any sectarian retribution.  
Among Syria’s Sunnis, different strands 
linked to Salafism and Sufism competed 
quietly for influence while an equilibrium 
that had been developed over centuries kept 
tensions in check. Most Sunnis tended to 
be socially conservative, falling somewhere 
between Salafism and Sufism. Neither made 
inroads in Syria on a mass scale as an 
ideology per se.  
However, from the early 2000s onward, 
the regime began to mess with this fragile 
balance to suit its political purposes, arbi-
trarily enhancing the Sunni ideological gap 
by giving certain groups freedom to pros-
elytize while denying it to others. Two ex-
amples on the Sufi side stand out. The first 
is the Sheikh Ahmad Kuftaru Foundation, 
whose top management the authorities al-
lowed to establish contact with Western em-
bassies as representatives of a moderate face 
of regime-backed Islam in Syria. The second 
is the al-Qubaisiyyat, a women-only group 
that flourished, mostly in Damascus, around 
2006, to the indignation of conservative 
Sunnis, who saw the Qubaisiyyat as a cult. 
Taking the stakes a significant notch 
higher, the regime facilitated recruitment 
of jihadists to undermine the US presence 
in Iraq from 2003 onwards, contributing to 
the spread of Salafism, mainly in rural re-
gions and poor urban outskirts. Confident 
in its ability to choreograph even the jihad-
ists, in 2006 the regime brought radicalized 
slum dwellers to the center of the capital. 
It allowed thousands into the diplomatic 
district of Damascus to demonstrate against 
the publishing of Danish cartoons that de-
picted the prophet. The protesters – fired 
up by regime-appointed clerical outfits – 
torched the Danish and Norwegian em-
bassies. European diplomats stationed in 
Damascus saw the episode as the product 
of the “invisible hand” of the regime. At the 
time, it was a thinly veiled warning that the 
regime could let the genie of radical Islam 
it had nurtured out of the bottle unless the 
West ended the isolation imposed on the 
Syrian government after the 2005 assassina-
tion of Lebanese statesman Rafik al-Hariri. 
The societal divides – ethnic and reli-
gious – carried little political significance 
at the start of the protests in 2011. Several 
high-profile Alawites, such as actors and 
filmmakers, supported the revolt. The pro-
democracy demonstrations broadly engulfed 
the countryside and the cities, as well as 
urban districts with different income levels 
and religious leanings. In the ensuing war, 
besieged rebel regions embraced religion 
more strongly, partly as a way to deal with 
the suffering from the indiscriminate re-
gime and Russian bombings. Salafism out-
paced moderating Sufi influences, and ideo-
logical polarization enhanced the levels of 
bitterness toward the cities, which were 
enjoying relative safety, and the suspicions 
that their Sunni inhabitants had “sold out” 
to the regime. Damascus, in particular, be-
came increasingly seen as lacking religious 
credentials because the capital had been 
influenced by Sufism, whose adherents are 
considered apostates by more doctrinaire 
Islamists. 
By mid-2017 the regime had captured 
through siege warfare most districts it had 
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lost to rebels in the capital and on the out-
skirts, except for Eastern Ghouta. Salafism 
had roots in the area, which were rekindled 
before the revolt by the regime’s tacit sup-
port for jihadists. Eastern Ghouta merchants 
tended to view themselves as “close to the 
people,” as opposed to the more aloof Da-
mascenes associated with Sufism, and gener-
ally backed the revolt. One Eastern Ghouta 
merchant went as far back as to blame the 
Damascenes for the death of Ibn Taimiyyah, 
a Levantine theologian who inspired mod-
ern Salafist movements and died while 
imprisoned at the Damascus citadel during 
Mamluk rule in 1328. 
Damascus residents, however, have had 
little room to show or act on any sympathies 
with their Sunni co-religionists because of 
the abundance of security in Assad’s seat of 
power. A 2012 strike organized by Damas-
cene merchants to protest the massacre of 
more than 100 Sunni civilians in Homs 
governorate was swiftly quelled. After the 
rise of jihadists, a sentiment might have 
prevailed among those merchants who had 
not fled the country that Syria, under Assad, 
was still preferable to the Islamic State or 
Taliban-style rule. Among those who re-
mained, many stayed – not out of support 
for the regime but because they feared that 
if they left, the various pro-regime Shi’ite 
militia recruited from inside and outside 
Syria would take over their properties. Al-
though the militias’ presence is reportedly 
visible in the Old City, home to some of the 
busiest markets, the regime sought to keep 
the conservative shopkeepers in Damascus 
as a façade of “normal” economic activity 
during the war. 
New Tribal Landscape 
In relative terms, the most powerful among 
the traditional Sunni components of the 
regime have been the Arab tribes. Their 
knowledge and rooting in the large land-
scape they inhabit east of Aleppo, Hama, 
and Homs to the Iraqi border made them 
indispensable to the different powers that 
captured the region after 2011. 
The effects of the war varied according to 
the outside powers present in the respective 
area. Tribes that had remained on the side 
of the regime tended to gain influence and 
expanded their social networks. For instance, 
Bani Izza, a branch of the Mawali tribe north 
of Hama, was one of the pro-regime forma-
tions that emerged with enhanced status. 
Ahmad Mubarak Darwish, head of Bani 
Izza, was similar to other tribal figures be-
fore the revolt. He was awarded for his loy-
alty with a seat in the rubber stamp parlia-
ment elected in 2003 and claimed more 
prestige by adjudicating local disputes. The 
regime ignored the smuggling in the area, 
which turned during the war into a conduit 
between the regime, the Islamic State, and 
rebel territory. Darwish carved out a mid-
dleman role between all three. Sunni mer-
chants who had fled Hama to Turkey would 
contact him to send Turkish goods to their 
old networks in the city. Fuel from Islamic 
State areas would pass through him to vari-
ous regions. 
Outside regime areas, particularly in 
eastern Syria, a struggle for resources pro-
duced tribal rifts, widening divisions in 
local societies that were fragmented by the 
regime’s divide-and-rule policy in the pre-
vious decades. In the eastern governorates 
of Raqqa, Deir al-Zor, and Hasakah to the 
east, various tribes fought among them-
selves for oil and gas until the Islamic State 
took control of much of the region in 2013. 
Senior tribesmen who had enjoyed relative 
independence were placed on a short leash, 
with the local emirs from the Islamic State 
reigning supreme. 
Kurds Rise As Societal Actors 
The Islamic State’s capture of the east 
increased support among Syrian Kurds for 
the US-backed People’s Protection Units 
(YPG) militia, a subsidiary of the PKK. The 
YPG’s advances against the Islamic State, 
starting in late 2014, altered again the 
societal landscape in the region and em-
powered YPG diehards, who became the 
new powerbrokers. 
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The YPG has cooperated with Assad since 
the beginning of the revolt, violently sup-
pressing anti-Assad protests and acting as 
a supply conduit to the regime’s military. 
With the consent of the regime, the YPG 
area expanded to comprise both Kurdish 
and Arab regions. It has been divided since 
2014 into three so-called cantons: al-Jazeera 
in the eastern Hasakah governorate, Afrin 
near Aleppo, and Kobanê, which is situated 
between the other two. After the YPG con-
solidated its power, middlemen linked to 
the YPG emerged to sell wheat crops to the 
regime, such as in the Ras al-Ain region on 
the border with Turkey, and to handle oil 
produced in Hasakah’s Rumeilan, one of 
Syria’s largest oil fields. Local figures in 
Kurdish cities and towns yielded to armed 
YPG cadres, who violently suppressed dis-
sent. The YPG not only demanded loyalty 
from the local Kurdish community figures. 
They had to be “Apogis,” or ideologically 
fervent believers, in the personality cult of 
Abdullah Öcalan to win any favor with the 
YPG. Many among the educated Kurds sub-
sequently left their hometowns, resulting 
in a reported shortage of qualified workers 
across the Kurdish areas of Syria. Others left 
merely to escape conscription into the YPG. 
The fragmentation among the Arab 
tribes played into the hands of the YPG as 
it captured traditional Arab areas from the 
Islamic State. The YPG set up units such as 
military councils and local administrations, 
in which Arab tribal figures would receive 
positions with lofty titles. The Democratic 
Union Party (PYD), the YPG’s political divi-
sion, has also been an actor that has created 
a myriad of councils and organized the buy-
in of certain local Arab tribes. However, any 
significant decision-making has remained 
implicitly with the YPG militia actors. Under 
them, the social contract appears similar 
to previous Assad regime structures, under 
which the de facto viceroy was often the 
Alawite security agent behind the scenes, 
not the “popular democracy” structures 
erected to give the appearance of offering 
a say to the local populations. 
Shi’ite Militias in Charge 
From 2012 to 2013 onward, ethnic cleansing 
has become a weapon of the war – directed 
most prominently against the Sunni popu-
lation in rebel areas – and been used by dif-
ferent military actors. In these rebel areas, 
various Shi’ite militia, backed by Iran, have 
become the new masters of many of the 
communities, whose members were largely 
uprooted and have fled to neighboring 
countries or to Europe in large numbers. 
The population transfers have centered 
on Damascus and its surroundings, and the 
adjacent governorate of Homs – areas com-
prised mostly of Sunnis that had acted as 
the main centers for skilled labor for Syria 
and beyond. Two loyalist towns inhabited 
by Shi’ites in northern Syria were also 
largely emptied of their inhabitants in 2017 
as part of a deal negotiated by Qatar. The 
deal involved the emptying of two other 
Sunni towns near Damascus and was met 
with little international objection. 
Fragmentation and internal contradic-
tions among the various Shi’ite militia, how-
ever, have reflected on the functioning of 
societies in the areas of Syria the militias 
had captured, even after they drove out the 
Sunnis. Among them, Hezbollah remains 
the most powerful and has the slickest 
propaganda operation. However, its author-
ity has been undermined by working in 
Syria with less disciplined allies comprised 
of Shi’ite militia from Syria, Iraq, and Af-
ghanistan, as well as local Alawite militia 
more focused on loot than ideology. 
Syrian Shi’ites, who had played second 
fiddle as a small pro-regime social group, 
were elevated militarily and financially by 
support from Iran. By mid-2017 strategic 
parts of Syria along the Lebanese border 
from al-Qusair to al-Zabadani had fallen to 
Hezbollah and a variety of Iranian-backed 
militia from Syria and elsewhere. United in 
subduing the Sunni populations that had 
risen against Assad, they apparently have 
not managed to set up a coherent admin-
istration. One resident of the al-Qalamoun 
region described that approvals issued by 
Hezbollah to move around or its orders to 
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release detainees were not necessarily 
honored by the other Iranian-backed war-
lords in the area. 
Long-term Transformation 
The social change unleashed during the con-
flict is set to play out, regardless of whether 
the regime consolidates, remains weak, or  
– however unlikely at this current stage – 
falls. Among the millions who fled Syria to 
neighboring countries and to Europe, the 
upending of social strata is likely to be even 
more profound and diverse. 
The Assad regime has sought to present 
itself as the only civil war player that could 
put the society back together. However, it 
has lost control of the forces it has unleash-
ed, throwing society into new levels of cul-
tural, ideological, and economic disarray. 
Not least, the regime faces societal chal-
lenges from its own ranks. Its approach be-
fore the revolt in dealing with elements 
that grew too powerful was to dispose of 
them or cut them down to size. The threat 
of violence was key to the takeover by 
Assad’s immediate relatives – mainly his 
brother and cousins – of a large proportion 
of the economy and illicit activities, as 
well as government procurement. They will 
have to contend with the new war rich to 
maintain their dominance. Newly empow-
ered actors are unlikely to accept a return 
to the status quo ante once the common 
foe disappears. In an indication of brewing 
tensions, several incidents of gang-style 
violence have been reported since 2012 
between Assad family members and other 
Alawites. 
If the international maneuvering results 
in a deal that facelifts the current regime 
and allows it to try to again broaden its 
cooptation strategies, the regime could still 
find it difficult to pacify the rural Sunnis. 
The YPG, which has taken rural Sunni areas 
east of Aleppo from the Islamic State, could 
face the same problem. Although the YPG 
has adopted a governing model similar to 
that of the regime, land and other disputes 
still mar the ties between the Kurds and 
Arabs. The YPG’s strength might prove to 
be ultimately dependent on US support. 
Without it, the Arab inhabitants of rural 
and tribal Syria are likely to look with less 
deference at the YPG and the “democratic” 
structures it has set up. 
In rebel areas more in the interior of 
Syria, rural Sunnis have, in some cases, 
tasted social mobility without dependence 
on the social arrangements related to the 
regime. They developed their own mustad‘ 
afoun (the oppressed) narrative with the 
help of the various religious ideologues 
from inside and outside Syria who began 
operating freely for the first time in the 
country as large parts of the countryside 
fell to the rebels. The narrative could be 
a main tool for continuous social mobiliza-
tion, which, similar to the suffering of 
the Shi’ites of Iraq under Saddam, would 
remain latent even if the Syrian revolt is 
annihilated. The rural population, however, 
has seen many of the various rebel factions 
control their towns and villages and act 
as warlords. A proportion might prefer to 
return to the regime, especially if the re-
gime gathers enough resources to bring 
back huge crop and fuel subsidies it had 
cut before the revolt. 
The upheavals dealt to the societal struc-
tures since the revolt and the amount of 
trust lost between the different and frag-
mented components of society highlight 
the need for an inclusive and democratic 
solution to the civil war. Such an approach 
is in many cases anathema to the outside 
powers that are busy with finding geopoliti-
cal arrangements they believe would end 
the conflict to their interests. It is likely to 
take decades to heal the wounds within 
Syrian society – from the civil war as well 
as the social engineering and sectarian rule 
since the Assad clan took power in 1970 – 
and rebuild levels of trust between social 
groups that will allow for co-existence. But 
without addressing issues of justice, govern-
ance, judicial reform, pervasive corruption, 
and an enforceable anti-trust system, exist-
ing cleavages would deepen and new ones 
would appear. 
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